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Abstract
In financial markets, abnormal trading behaviors pose a serious challenge to market surveillance and risk manage-
ment. What is worse, there is an increasing emergence of abnormal trading events that some experienced traders
constitute a collusive clique and collaborate to manipulate some instruments, thus mislead other investors by applying
similar trading behaviors for maximizing their personal benefits. In this paper, a method is proposed to detect the
hidden collusive cliques involved in an instrument of future markets by first calculating the correlation coefficient
between any two eligible unified aggregated time series of signed order volume, and then combining the connected
components from multiple sparsified weighted graphs constructed by using the correlation matrices where each cor-
relation coefficient is over a user-specified threshold. Experiments conducted on real order data from the Shanghai
Futures Exchange show that the proposed method can effectively detect suspect collusive cliques. A tool based on
the proposed method has been deployed in the exchange as a pilot application for futures market surveillance and risk
management.
Keywords: Futures markets, Financial trading behaviors, Collusive cliques, Correlation coefficient, Weighted graph,
Unevenly-spaced time series.
1. Introduction
In financial markets, trading behaviors roughly re-
fer to operations and actions conducted by individual
investors to buy and sell financial instruments through
an exchange institute. Although normal trading activi-
ties are dominating, abnormal market behaviors (for ex-
ample, price manipulation and circular trading) happen
now and then, especially in the emerging financial mar-
kets [1–5]. These abnormal behaviors not only impact
market running mechanism and pricing mechanism, but
also threaten the safety of financial markets and hurt the
interests of righteous investors. What is worse, there is
an increasing emergence of abnormal trading events that
for maximizing their personal benefits, some traders
constitute a collusive clique and collaborate with each
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other to manipulate the movement of some instruments,
thus mislead other investors. Collusive trading activ-
ities [4–6] are becoming a threatening and concealed
type of financial market manipulations. And discov-
ering the hidden collusive cliques from numerous mar-
ket participants and massive trading data poses a tough
challenge to financial market surveillance and risk man-
agement, which thus has attracted increasing attention
of market regulators and researchers in recent years.
This is reasonable and natural when we consider this
issue under the situation that the world is still struggling
from the financial crisis.
The goal of this study is to detect collusive cliques
in futures markets based on similar trading behaviors of
investors. Empirical observation and analysis of trad-
ing operations of the market participants can provide
the clue to detecting the collusive cliques in futures trad-
ing. The members of a clique are usually similar to each
other in trading behavior while different from the those
outside the clique. The similar trading behavior indi-
cates that the members buy or sell a certain instrument
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roughly at the same time point and even their order vol-
ume is correlated. On the contrary, the trading behav-
iors of ordinary (normal) investors who do not belong to
any collusive clique have little possibility of being cor-
related. Admittedly, some “clever” traders may attempt
to take different operations for counteracting collusive
behaviors, which makes their activities appear just as
normal investors so that they can escape from being de-
tected. However, successful disguising needs not only
high financial operation skills on one hand but also ex-
tra cost on the other hand, which prevents such collu-
sive behaviors from happening popularly. This paper
focuses on detecting the first kind of collusive behav-
iors where individual investors show (roughly) similar
trading pattern, and leaves the problem of detecting the
second kind of collusive behaviors where individual in-
vestors must not have similar trading fashion as future
work.
In this paper, we propose an effective method to iden-
tify the collusive cliques from numerous market partic-
ipants. We first select the dataset of real order records
from the Shanghai Futures Exchange1 by conducting a
comparative analysis on major information of futures
trading activities. Then, taking signed order volume
as the characteristic variable of futures trading activ-
ities, which can reliably reflect the trading intentions
of investors, we define a unified aggregated time series
to alleviate the disturbance caused by time difference
of trading event occurrences, and calculate the corre-
lation coefficient between any two eligible unified ag-
gregated series. Next, based on the correlation matrix
of one trading day, a weighted graph is constructed by
using the edges whose weights are above a predefined
threshold. After that, the separate connected compo-
nents in the weighted graphs of multiple trading days
are combined into an integrated weighted graph where
the weight of each edge is the sum of its occurrences
in different weighted graphs, and these edges whose
weights below a predefined threshold are given up. Fi-
nally, the connected subgraphs in the integrated graph
are taken as suspect collusive cliques. Our method is
mainly inspired by the empirical observation and analy-
sis on the real trading data, and we put the first priority
on the method’s practicality in real applications of mar-
ket surveillance and risk management.
This paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we
provide a survey of some of the related work. The real
dataset used in our study is introduced in Section 3. Sec-
tion 4 gives the detail of the proposed detection method
1http://www.shfe.com.cn
and the concrete algorithms. Experimental results are
presented in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper and highlights some future works.
2. Related Work
To the best of our knowledge, there is no related work
that detects collusive cliques in futures markets based on
similar trading behaviors as studied in this paper. How-
ever, some works have dedicated to the problem of de-
tecting abnormal trading activities in financial markets
from different perspectives. For example, price manip-
ulation, one of major fraudulent trading activities, have
been investigated by various methods, including pat-
tern recognition based approach [1], behavioral statistic
model [2, 4, 7, 8], rational expectation theory of corners
[9] and domain driven data mining [10].
As an emerging kind of abnormal activities in finan-
cial markets, collusive activities among investors re-
cently have been investigated from different aspects for
explaining market manipulation. For distinguishing the
irregular trading patterns from the regular trading opera-
tions, Franke et al [11] developed detection approaches
based on spectral clustering method. They generated
a trader network to represent the trading behaviors of
traders and thus characterized the market. If the ac-
tual market behaviors deviate from the allowed trad-
ing behaviors in the market, then irregularities are re-
ported. However, this study was conducted on an ex-
perimental stock market. Palshikar et al [5] proposed a
graph clustering algorithm for detecting a set of collu-
sive traders who have heavier trading among themselves
compared to their trading with the other traders. They
constructed stock flow graph with synthetic trading data
to represent the trading relationships between traders,
and applied the graph clustering method to find collu-
sive traders. Cao et al [6] argued that market manipula-
tion derives from the activities of a group of hidden ma-
nipulators who collaborate with each other to manipu-
late three trading sequences: buy-orders, sell-orders and
trades, through carefully arranging their prices, volumes
and time. They proposed a a coupled Hidden Markov
Models(HMM)-based approach to describing the inter-
active behaviors among group members, and further to
detecting abnormal manipulative trading behaviors on
orderbook-level stock data.
Comparing with these works above, our study in
this paper has three distinct features as follows: first,
our work addresses collusive clique detection in futures
markets, while the existing works all studied irregularity
discovery in stock markets. Although both futures and
stock are financial products, their trading mechanisms
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are quite different. Second, we build weighted graphs to
characterize the interactions among the investors based
on their trading behaviors, which is different from the
existing works that also used graph based approaches.
Last but not least, our method is inspired by and evalu-
ated with real order data of futures trading in the Shang-
hai Futures Exchange. However, most existing works
(not including Cao et al [6]) evaluated their methods by
synthetic data.
In fact, the detection of collusive behaviors has also
studied in other fields, including online auction systems
[12, 13], online recommender systems [14–17], online
reputation systems [18–20] and P2P file sharing net-
works [21, 22]. Solutions of these systems are effective
in the respective scenarios, but none of them could be
applied to the detection of collusive cliques in the fu-
tures markets for three reasons. First, trading activities
in the futures markets are complicated. For example,
every investor can continuously open or close long/short
positions in any futures contract. Second, there are hun-
dreds of thousands of order recodes submitted to futures
trading systems in one typical trading day. Such large
scale data sets could not appear in most online auction
systems or reputation systems. Last but not least, behav-
ioral ratings and interaction between two colluders are
not the ideal description of collusion behaviors for high
frequent order sequences in the futures trading systems.
In our study, one key technique for detecting of
collusive cliques is the measure of similarity between
a pair of unevenly-spaced time series. The simi-
larity of time series has been measured by various
metrics, including Euclidean distance (ED) [23, 24]
and more sophisticated metrics, such as Dynamic
Time Warping (DTW) [25, 26], Edit distance with
Real Penalty (ERP) [27], distance based on Longest
Common Subsequence (LCSS) [28], Edit Distance on
Real sequences (EDR) [29], Spatial Assembling Dis-
tance (SpADe) [30] and Sequence Weighted ALignmEnt
model (SWALE) [31]. These representation and dis-
tance measures mentioned above have been comprehen-
sively evaluated by comparative experiments in [32] for
querying and mining of time series database. These
methods try to identify matching elements between time
series. However, the trading behavior similarity of two
investors in collusive clique detection is characterized
by the conformity and correlation between the pair of
corresponding time series of signed volume, which em-
phasizes the shape similarity instead of magnitude simi-
larity. Time stamp of trading activity is a principal char-
acteristic to evaluate the similarity between two time se-
ries of signed volume. Two time series even with the
same shape happening in different time periods could
not been considered to be similar. For these reasons,
correlation measurement is more appropriate for our
study.
3. The Dataset
Data is the key to data mining. Understanding the
data is crucial to the design of data mining algorithms.
In this section, we will introduce the dataset used in this
study for detecting collusive cliques in futures markets.
In futures trading, there are different types of data,
such as order records, trade results and position
changes, which can provide clue to describing the trad-
ing behavior of a market participant. An order is an
instruction to buy or sell instruments, submitted by an
investor to the electronic trading platform of the ex-
change institute. The order record indicates the trad-
ing intention of the investor to buy or sell how much
volume of a specific instrument at the price of the mo-
ment. The eligible orders from buyers and sellers are
matched according to a certain rule via the electronic
trading platform, and trade reports are sequentially gen-
erated for the investors. Both the dealing prices and the
trade volumes of the transactions are derived from the
corresponding orders and are dependent on the current
market situation such as the last prices and the order
volumes of counterparts. The trading results will lead
to position changes of the involved investor. Therefore,
both trading results and position changes are the deriva-
tive consequences of order records, they can only partly
represent the investors’ intentions. However, order in-
formation can properly characterize the investors’ trad-
ing behaviors.
The dataset used in our investigation is entirely
from the real order series of the Shanghai Futures Ex-
change, which is the largest one in China’s domestic fu-
tures market and has considerable impact on the global
derivative market. Currently, the electronic trading plat-
form of the exchange institute receives only limit or-
ders submitted by the investors. There are hundreds of
thousands of order records from market investors in one
typical trading day, which is comprised of the open call
auction (8:55 - 8:59) and four continuous auction ses-
sions (9:00-10:15, 10:30-11:30, 13:30-14:10 and 14:20-
15:00). We collect a representative order dataset that
cover three active futures contracts, including copper,
fuel oil and natural rubber in the nine trading days from
Sep 16, 2008 to Sep 26, 2008. The dataset contains
1,893,519 order records and involves 66,861 market
participants.
The statistic information of the order records of the
three futures contracts is given in Table 1. A limit order
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Table 1. The statistic information of the order dataset of three
futures contracts, including copper, fuel oil and natural rubber
in the nine trading days from Sep 16, 2008 to Sep 26, 2008.
Futures Number of orders Number of investors
copper 441,104 19,414
fuel oil 650,079 22,537
natural rubber 802,336 24,910
record includes a virtual ID representing the investor,
bid/ask indicator, order price and volume. All other sen-
sitive information is filtered out for privacy preservation
reason.
4. Methodology
In this section, we will describe the detail of the
method employed to detect collusive cliques by calcu-
lating correlation coefficients between trading series and
constructing weighted graphs from the correlation coef-
ficient matrices. The algorithms for implementing the
method are also given.
4.1. Selection of the Target Variable
A limit order refers to an order submitted by an in-
vestor to buy or sell an instrument at a specific price
(rather than a market price), thus it contains the fun-
damental information such as bid/ask indicator, order
price and order size. For these fields of a limit order
record, which one can be used as a representative data
item to describe the trading intention of an investor? To
answer this question, let us first check these fields in
detail.
As a piece of crucial information, the bid/ask indica-
tor indicates whether the order is a buy limit order or a
sell limit order and whether the investor wants to own or
to abandon the asset. The order price is a specific price
at which the investor hopes the order will be filled. Gen-
erally, the price that is close to the latest trade price of
the market will be immediately filled, and the prices of
orders submitted during a short period are almost the
same. Consequently, the price that is dependent on the
market situation does not distinguish the investors’ in-
tentions. The order volume reflects the amount of asset
that a investor intends to buy or sell.
Based on the preceding analysis of different fields in
limit order records, we decide to combine the order vol-
ume and the bid/ask indicator into a signed order vol-
ume as the proper representation of a participant’s trad-
ing intention. A signed order volume sequence denotes
the bid indicator with positive sign for buy order, and
denotes the ask indicator with negative sign for sell or-
der. That is, in a signed order volume sequence, the
volume of a buy order is positive while the volume of a
seller order is negative. By using signed order volume
to describe a trading event of a certain investor at the
moment of submitting her/his order, a discrete event se-
quence over a period of trading time can naturally char-
acterizes the trading behavior of an investor.
For a futures investor, we denote by v(ti) the signed
order volume of an order submitted by her/him at time
ti (i=1, 2, · · · , N). N is the length of the sequence {ti},
which may be different for different investors, and the
time points of the sequences for different investors can
also be different. Thus, the time series {v(ti)} of the
signed order volume is an unevenly-spaced event se-
quence.
Example 1. Table 2 illustrates the construction of two
signed order volume sequences from the limit order se-
quences of two investors #1 and #2. In the table, the
first five columns are the information fields of limit or-
ders, and the last column represents the signed order
volume. The timestamp of limit order is in the format
using the colon as the separation character.
4.2. Aggregated Time Series
The event series of signed order volume above is not
appropriate to calculate the behavior similarity of differ-
ent investors due to two reasons as follow. On one hand,
even though two investors belonging to a clique desire
to apply the same order strategy, their operations can
not be accurately synchronous in practice, usually there
exists a little lag for some reasons (e.g., network speed
or the queuing policy of the exchange). On the other
hand, the active speculators such as day traders always
issue a large number of order records, their long event
sequences make the computation of behavior similarity
more complex. Therefore, here we introduce an aggre-
gated sequence to replace the original signed order vol-
ume sequence to represent the behavior of an investor.
We specify the size δt of a time window. Given a
signed order volume sequence, we split the sequence
from its starting timestamp into a series of consecutive
windows (or segments) of length δt, each of which is
labeled by its time index whose value is an positive in-
teger starting from 0. That is, the first window is labeled
by 0, the second one is by 1, and so on. For the i-th win-
dow, its time index is denoted by si, and it covers the
scope of time [siδt, (si + 1)δt). We aggregate the signed
volumes of different orders happening within each win-
dow into a single value. Concretely, for the i-th window,
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Table 2. The limit order sequences of two investors and the corresponding signed order volume sequences. The first five columns
are the information fields of limit orders. The last column represents the signed order volume whose positive sign means buy order
and negative sign means sell order.
Investor Timestamp Indicator Price Volume Signed volume
1 09:00:30 Buy 3211 2 2
1 09:03:06 Sell 3216 2 -2
1 09:03:12 Sell 3214 1 -1
1 09:08:02 Sell 3206 2 -2
1 09:08:26 Buy 3204 6 6
1 09:10:28 Sell 3205 3 -3
2 09:00:40 Buy 3211 3 3
2 09:03:04 Sell 3216 4 -4
2 09:03:10 Buy 3214 2 2
2 09:08:05 Sell 3206 3 -3
2 09:08:30 Buy 3204 10 10
2 09:12:02 Buy 3201 2 2
the aggregation value V(si) is the sum of all signed vol-
umes of orders happening in [siδt, (si + 1)δt). Formally,
V(si) =
∑
siδt≤t j<(si+1)δt
v(t j). (1)
Above, v(t j) is the signed volume of an order happen-
ing at the timestamp t j in the signed order volume se-
quence under study. Thus, a signed order volume se-
quence can be transformed to an aggregated sequence,
denoted by {(si,V(si))} (si=0, 1, 2, · · · ). Furthermore,
we discard any aggregated point si whose aggregated
value V(si)=0, then get the final aggregated signed or-
der volume sequence, which is an aggregated time se-
ries.
Example 2. For the data in Table 2, let δt=60 sec-
onds and the starting timestamp of the order series is
09:00:00, we can get the time index sequences of the
aggregated sequences for the two investors #1 and #2
are {0, 3, 8, 10} and {0, 3, 8, 12} , respectively. And
the two signed order volume sequences are aggregated
into two aggregated signed order volume sequences as
follows: {(0, 2), (3, -3), (8, 4), (10, -3)} and {(0, 3), (3,
-2), (8, 7), (12, 2)}.
In practice, there will be no aggregated data in a cer-
tain time span if there is no order event occurring at
all during that period, thus the aggregated time series is
unevenly spaced. The time window size δt determines
the granularity of aggregation and the length of the ag-
gregated series. By enlarging the window size, buying
and selling volumes within a window may counteract,
which thus makes the aggregated value of that window
smaller and consequently degrades the calculation re-
sult. Therefore, a reasonable time window size is criti-
cal to the calculation of behavior correlation coefficient.
Furthermore, the collusive investors tend to fre-
quently place orders to influence the market, they easily
become the active traders in the market. Consequently,
the investors with few orders will very possibly be ex-
cluded from the detected potential collusive cliques be-
cause they will not be highly correlated with these in-
vestors who have more orders. To reduce the unnec-
essary computation and thus boost efficiency, we filter
out some investors who have few orders before corre-
lation coefficient computation. Concretely, we compare
the length of each aggregated time series with an em-
pirical threshold (δL), and only these with a length no
shorter than the threshold are kept for further process-
ing. We call these aggregated time series eligible aggre-
gated signed order volume series. So only the eligible
aggregated signed order volume series will be used for
correlation coefficient computation and potential collu-
sive cliques detection.
4.3. Unified Aggregated Time Series and Correlation
Measure
The trading behavior similarity between two in-
vestors is evaluated by the strength of association be-
tween the corresponding aggregated time series, which
is commonly measured by correlation coefficient [33,
34]. In statistics, correlation coefficient is used as an in-
dicator of the degree to which an event or phenomenon
is associated with, related to, or can be predicted from
another, as well as a strength measure of linear relation-
ship between two variables. It has been widely applied
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in the financial area. We adopts correlation coefficient
as the similarity measure of two investors’ trading be-
haviors.
Let us consider two investors A and B, and their ag-
gregated time series are denoted by VA and VB, respec-
tively. Both aggregated time series are unevenly spaced
and discrete, and their time indices sAi and sBi with the
same subscript i are not necessary the same, thus the
methods for evenly-spaced time series are not applica-
ble here. We merge their time index sets sA and sB into
a unified time index set s, i.e., s = sA ∪ sB. Based on
the unified time index set, we define the unified aggre-
gated time series of signed order volume of investor A
as follows:
UA(sk) =
{
VA(sk), sk ∈ sA
0. otherwise (2)
Similar definition is applied to the aggregated time se-
ries VB of investor B, and we get the unified aggregated
time series UB of investor B.
Example 3. Following Example 2, we go further to
compute the unified aggregated time series of investor
#1 and #2. The unified time index set is {0, 3, 8, 10} ∪
{0, 3, 8, 12} = {0, 3, 8, 10, 12}. According to Equation 2,
we have the unified aggregated time series U1 and U2 as
follows: U1 = {(0, 2), (3, -3), (8, 4), (10, -3), (12, 0)},
U2 = {(0, 3), (3, -2), (8, 7), (10, 0), (12, 2)}.
The correlation coefficient is evaluated between uni-
fied aggregated time series. For UA and UB, their corre-
lation coefficient rAB is defined as follows:
rAB =
< UAUB > − < UA >< UB >√
(< U2A > − < UA >2)(< U2B > − < UB >2)
(3)
where the angular brackets < · · · > represents the av-
erage over all the aggregated events (or points) in the
series. The correlation coefficient r is between -1 and 1.
A positive r value indicates the existence of positive cor-
relation, while a negative r value implies negative corre-
lation. A zero r means no correlation and the two time
series are independent from each other. For collusive
clique detection, negative correlation is little significant
because it means the trading behaviors of two investors
are almost opposite. In fact, only positive correlation is
of significance for collusive cliques detection.
Example 4. Following Example 3, according to
Equation 3, the correlation coefficient between the two
unified aggregated time series U1 and U2 is 0.956,
which means that the trading behaviors of the two
investors are strongly positive correlated.
When considering N investors, the correlation coeffi-
cients between any two investors i, j build a correlation
matrix R, which is an N × N matrix where the entry
ri j indicates the correlation coefficient between two uni-
fied aggregated time series Ui and U j. The correlation
matrix is symmetric because the correlation between Ui
and U j is the same as the correlation between U j and
Ui. The diagonal elements in the matrix are the self-
correlation coefficients of all unified aggregated time se-
ries, and the values are 1.
4.4. Discovery of collusive cliques
With the correlation coefficient matrix, we construct
a weighted graph in which a node represents an investor
in the market, and an edge is added to connect two nodes
if the correlation coefficient between the two nodes’ cor-
responding unified aggregated time series is larger than
a user-specified threshold (δw). Note that the weighted
graph constructed does not contain loop edges and there
is no more than one edge between any two nodes, and
the weight of each edge is the correlation coefficient.
The resulting graph is not necessary a connected graph,
very possibly it may includes some isolated nodes and
some connected components (subgraphs). An isolated
node has no link to any other nodes, and a connected
component may be a complete graph, which means that
all nodes in the component are highly similar to each
other but weakly similar to the other nodes outside the
component. Obviously, the connected components con-
form to the criterion of potential collusive cliques. Cer-
tainly, the value of correlation coefficient threshold δw
will surely influence the number of resulting connected
components. As the threshold increases, the number
of resulting connected components will reduce, and the
detected result will be more reliable but some suspect
traders may be neglected. On the contrary, when de-
creasing the threshold, the number of false collusive
cliques (noise) will rise, which will degrade the detec-
tion precision. Therefore, a proper threshold δw is of
substantial importance to guarantee the detection per-
formance.
It is always the case that we do not know how many
collusive cliques exist and who belongs to which clique
in the market. Fortunately, some practical observation
can help us to make the decision. That is, a collusive
clique will conduct cooperative and abnormal actions
repeatably. So if a doubtful clique happens in multiple
trading days, it is reasonable to believe that it is a sus-
pect collusive clique. Thus we consider multiple con-
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tinuous trading days, and construct one weighted graph
for each trading day, then combine the connected com-
ponents in the daily graphs into an integrated weighted
graph in which the weight of each edge is the sum of its
occurrences in different weighted graphs. Finally, the
connected subgraphs in the integrated graph are output
as suspect collusive cliques by eliminating the isolated
nodes and the edges whose weights are below a prede-
fined threshold (δ f ).
4.5. The algorithms
Our method of collusive clique detection by similar
trading behavior analysis mainly consists of two stages:
• Computing the unified aggregated time series of
signed order volume for each investor, and calcu-
lating the correlation coefficient matrix based on
all eligible unified aggregated time series, and
• Identifying suspect collusive cliques by combining
the connected components in the weighted graphs
of multiple continuous trading days into an inte-
grated weighted graph.
We develop two algorithms to implement the tasks of
the two stages above. They are outlined in Algorithm 1
and Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 1 aggregates the signed order volumes of a
market investor in every time window of a trading day to
a single value, and filters out the short aggregated time
series, and then calculates the correlation coefficient be-
tween any two unified aggregated time series. This al-
gorithm’s input is the preprocessed order records set of
one futures contract in a single trading day and each
order record includes the investor’s virtual ID, signed
order volume and a second-based timestamp converted
from the time format that uses the colon as separation
character.
With the correlation coefficient matrix, Algorithm 2
is developed to detect collusive cliques. It first con-
structs one weighted graph for each of trading day,
and then merges the connected components of the daily
graphs into an integrated weighted graph. For each con-
nected component in the integrated weighted graph, if
the weights of all its edges are no less than the threshold
δ f , then the connected component is output as a suspect
collusive clique.
5. Experiments and Discussions
In this section, we will present the experimental re-
sults with real order data of three futures contracts from
Algorithm 1: Calculating correlation coefficient
matrix
Input: Order record set D of one futures contract in
one trading day, time window size δt, length
threshold δL of aggregated time series
Output: Correlation coefficient matrix R
T := ∅;
for each investor p do
Extract time series vp of signed order volume
from D;
Aggregate vp by summing up signed order
volumes in each time window s of size δt. The
aggregated time series is denoted as Vp;
if |Vp| >= δL then
Add Vp to T ;
end
end
for each Vi,V j ∈ T, i , j do
Merge the two time index sequences si and s j
into an unified time index sequence s with
s = sort(si ∪ s j);
Unify Vi based on s into Ui by
{Ui(sk)} = {Vi(sk)|sk ∈ si} ∪ {0|sk ∈ s, sk < si},
Unify V j into U j in the same way;
Calculate correlation coefficient ri j between Ui
and U j according to the following formula:
ri j =
<UiU j>−<Ui><U j>√
<U2i −<Ui>2><U
2
j −<U j>2>
;
end
Output R;
the Shanghai Futures Exchange. The experimental re-
sults confirm the effectiveness of the proposed method
in detecting collusive cliques.
5.1. The Effect of Time Window Size δt
In aggregating time series of signed order volume,
the length of time window δt is an important parame-
ter that will directly influence the correlation coefficient
calculation. For examining the impact of window size
δt on correlation coefficient, we choose two time series
of signed order volume from the trading data of fuel
oil futures on September 25, 2008, which are shown
in Fig. 1(a). We aggregate the two time series with dif-
ferent sizes of time window. Fig. 1(b) shows the ag-
gregated time series with the time window size δt=60
seconds. Then we calculate the correlation coefficient
between the two resulting aggregated time series with
the time window size increasing from 1 to 200 seconds.
The results are shown in Fig. 2. We can see that the
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Algorithm 2: Detecting collusive cliques
Input: Correlation coefficient matrix set {Rd} for
one futures contract in multiple trading
days, threshold δw for constructing
weighted graphs, edge weight threshold δ f
for the integrated weighted graph.
Output: Candidate collusive cliques
for each correlation matrix Rd do
Construct a simple weighted graph using Rd as
the adjacent matrix, in which an edge exists if
its weight is greater than δw;
Obtain the connected components set S d of the
graph;
end
Merge {S d} into an integrated weighted graph G, in
which the weight of each edge is the sum of its
occurrences in {S d};
Eliminate the edges whose weights are below δ f ;
The connected subgraphs in G are output as
potential collusive cliques;
correlation coefficient increases as the size of time win-
dow enlarges, and it reaches asymptotically to a stable
value at about 60 seconds. The result is analogous to
the Epps effect [35–38] that the stock return correlation
decreases as the sampling frequency of data increases.
From Fig. 2, we argue that a time window of size 60
seconds is a reasonable choice in our experiments.
5.2. Determining the Length Threshold (δL) of Aggre-
gated Time Series
For the whole data set, the cumulative distribution
function F(L)=P(L′ < L) of the length L of aggre-
gated time series is shown in Fig. 3. As the figure
shows, about 90% time series are less than 15 in length
and are excluded from correlation coefficient calcula-
tion. There are only 10% investors included in collusive
detection, which reduces the complexity of correlation
calculation. Therefore, we choose 15 as the empirical
threshold (δL) value for filtering the short aggregated
time series, which means that an investor should have
placed orders in at least 15 time windows in a trading
day to be included in the collusive clique detection pro-
cedure. This choice conforms to the long-term surveil-
lance practical experience in the exchange institute.
5.3. The Effect of The Correlation Coefficient Thresh-
old δw
Now, we consider the order record data of the cop-
per futures contract in one typical trading day (Septem-
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Fig. 1. (a) The time series of signed order volume of two in-
vestors and (b) the corresponding aggregated time series with
δt=60 seconds. The aggregated time series with less data
points retain the profile of the original time series.
ber 18, 2008) to demonstrate the process of collusive
clique detection. After aggregating and filtering the
time series of signed order volume, we obtain 819 eligi-
ble aggregated time series for computing the correlation
coefficient matrix Mc.
We construct four weighted graphs based on Mc with
different correlation coefficient threshold values. In
Fig. 4, the number of connected components are 10,
8, 6 and 4, corresponding to the threshold values 0.80,
0.85, 0.90 and 0.95, respectively. The number of result-
ing connected components gradually decreases as the
threshold value grows. We notice that the connected
component with six nodes is (almost) a complete graph
in all the sub-figures. The reason is that the similar-
ity between any pair of nodes in the component is very
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Fig. 2. The impact of time window size δt on correlation
coefficient when aggregating two time series of signed order
volume. Each circle (in blue) indicates a correlation coeffi-
cient value at a certain window size. The average line (in
red) can more evidently demonstrate the trend after smoothing
data fluctuation. About 60 seconds are needed for the correla-
tion coefficient to reach its asymptotically stable value, which
means that it is reasonable to choose 60 seconds as the size of
time window in our experiments.
large. In practical applications, the supervisors of the
exchange institute can choose different threshold values
according to real surveillance requirements to observe
the suspect investors in different monitoring levels.
5.4. The Performance of the Proposed Method
According to the experimental results above, we
choose the following parameter values for the detec-
tion method: δt=60 seconds, δL=15, δw=0.90 and δ f=2.
We construct the daily weighted graphs of the three fu-
tures contracts (see Table 1) in nine consecutive trad-
ing days, and merge the connected components occur-
ring at least twice in the daily graphs into an integrated
weighted graph. We illustrate the integrated weighted
graphs for the copper, fuel oil and natural rubber fu-
tures contracts respectively in Fig. 5(a), Fig. 5(b) and
Fig. 5(c). There are eighteen connected subgraphs in
these figures. We can see that all the subgraphs are com-
plete graphs except the two ones {22069, 12633, 1680,
33473, 3956} in Fig. 5(b) and {24139, 21244, 29020}
in Fig. 5(c), and most subgraphs just appear twice in
the nine trading days, while the four subgraphs includ-
ing {24686, 28000} in Fig. 5(a), {12509, 21255, 11668}
in Fig. 5(b), {1680, 3203, 4324, 10032, 12633, 17891,
22069} and the largest component in Fig. 5(c) occur at
least three times. This means that these subgraphs can
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Fig. 3. The cumulative distribution F(L) of the length L of
aggregated time series over the whole data set. About 90%
time series are less than 15 (time windows) in length and are
excluded from correlation coefficient calculation.
be considered as suspect collusive cliques. The four
subgraphs occurring more than three times can be more
confidently regarded as collusive cliques.
Furthermore, by carefully checking the figures, we
notice that the set of investors {1680, 12633, 22069,
4324, 3203, 7891} forming a connected subgraph
in Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(c), and part of it {1680, 12633,
22069} appears in Fig. 5(b). In addition, the two sets of
investor {3956, 33473} and {4162, 4937, 4987} appear
in Fig. 5(b) and Fig. 5(c), and the two sets of investors
{3956, 33473} and {1680, 12633, 22069} are correlated
in the fuel oil futures for they unify together to a single
subgraph in Fig. 5(b). So we assert that these investor
sets form collusive cliques with high probability, which
will be further confirmed by related background data.
The experimental results for all the three futures con-
tracts are summarized in Table 3. The average number
Na of eligible aggregated time series in all the trading
days are much smaller than the number of correspond-
ing investors in Table 1. This indicates that a large
number of short aggregated time series are excluded
by the filter threshold δL and only the active investors
are kept for further processing. In Table 3, there are
many connected components that occur only once in the
nine trading days, though our method will not classify
them into suspect collusive cliques, the exchange insti-
tute still needs to pay attention to them in the following
trading days. Certainly, these detected suspect collusive
cliques should be further probed and confirmed via the
regulatory procedure of the supervision system in the
exchange institute. In practice, these suspect cliques,
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Fig. 4. The weighted graphs obtained by using different threshold δw values for the copper futures contract in a trading day. The
number of resulting connected components reduces as the threshold value increases. The threshold value is adjusted for different
monitoring levels in practical surveillance requirements.
even not confirmed, will be added to the “black” list of
the surveillance system.
Up to now, we have found some suspect collusive
cliques. Are they really collusive cliques? or can we
give some explanation on why they are treated as col-
lusive cliques. For this purpose, we firstly examine the
detected suspect collusive cliques carefully against the
surveillance archival data of the exchange. The archival
data covers the background information of all investors
and companies involved in the futures market. The find-
ings are interesting and promising. For most suspect
collusive cliques, their members are interrelated in one
or another way. They either come from the same com-
munity of a city or belong to the same company, or even
they are from a family. We also find that the accounts of
some cliques are controlled and operated by a backstage
manipulator. The interrelation information implies great
possibility to concert trading actions of members in a
clique. Now we come to the final step of this study: val-
idate the detected suspect collusive cliques in terms of
verified collusive cliques of the surveillance system and
judgement of experienced domain experts from the ex-
change institute. There are seventeen suspect collusive
cliques verified as collusive cliques. The numbers of
verified collusive cliques(the column Nt in Table 3) are
4, 4 and 9 for the futures contract copper, fuel oil and
natural rubber, respectively. Furthermore, we tracked
and analyzed the order records of the members of these
cliques, and the verified results were reconfirmed. The
only detected suspect collusive clique that is not verified
is from the fuel oil futures contract. The reason is that
we can not find enough evidence. For privacy reason,
we can not provide any more detail of these detected
cliques.
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Table 3. The experimental results of three futures contracts
(including copper, fuel oil and natural rubber) in nine consec-
utive trading days. ¯Na: the average number of eligible ag-
gregated time series in the nine trading days; Nc: the number
of the connected components in all weighted graphs; Ns: the
number of the connected subgraphs in the integrated weighted
graph, i.e., the number of detected suspect collusive cliques;
Nt: the number of the verified collusive cliques by surveillance
archival data of the exchange institute.
Futures ¯Na Nc Ns Nt
copper 480 14 4 4
fuel oil 955 14 5 4
natural rubber 1123 20 9 9
It is worthy of pointing out that the detected suspect
collusive cliques or even the verified collusive cliques
are not equal to real collusive criminal cliques in fi-
nancial markets. Nevertheless, the detection results are
still valuable to the market supervision department as
they can provide informative targets to the supervision
department for further probing, which is better than to
search potential financial criminal cliques from numer-
ous investors and massive trading data without any tar-
get.
6. Conclusion and discussion
A method for detecting collusive cliques in futures
trading markets has been proposed under the framework
of correlation analysis of traders’ behaviors and graphs
merging. The proposed method defines the aggregated
time series to summarize signed order volume series
to achieve robust results, and then calculates correla-
tion coefficient matrix over all eligible unified aggre-
gated time series of signed order volume to construct
weighted graphs, finally merges the connected compo-
nents from multiple weighted graphs corresponding to
multiple trading days into an integrated weighted graph.
Experiments are conducted to determine reasonable val-
ues for different parameters, including the size of time
window and other thresholds, and detect suspect collu-
sive cliques from real order data of three futures con-
tracts from the Shanghai Futures Exchange. The ma-
jor innovation of the proposed method lies in two as-
pects: a) the aggregated time series used to summarize
signed order volume series to alleviate the impacts of
timestamp difference between different order series and
data fluctuation, and b) the effective scheme to compute
the correlation coefficient between two unevenly-spaced
time series from irregular events. The proposed method
can also be applied to investigating other behavior sim-
ilarity of investors, for example, position changes per
trading day. Experimental results validate the effective-
ness of the proposed method. As a pilot application, a
tool based on the proposed method has been deployed in
the Shanghai Futures Exchange, to assist futures market
surveillant and risk management.
As for future work, we are considering to further op-
timize the method by utilizing the data of two neighbor-
ing time windows for balancing the uneven data distri-
bution. We also plan to take into account more trading
information such as canceled orders and trade reports
to enforce the information for detecting collusive. Fur-
thermore, we will explore effective approaches to de-
tecting collusive cliques that show “different” trading
behaviors.
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Fig. 5. The integrated weighted graphs of the copper (a), fuel oil (b) and natural rubber (c) futures by combining connected
components of daily weighted graphs in nine consecutive trading days. The weight of each edge is the sum of its occurrences in
each daily weighted graphs. Only those edges with weight no less than 2 are survived. Eventually, four (for copper), five (for
fuel oil) and nine (for natural rubber) connected subgraphs are obtained, which will be output as suspect collusive cliques by our
method. For the largest connected component at the bottom-right part of the figure (c), the edge weights are not shown due to space
limit on the figure. However, we have computed the average value of its edge weights, which is 3.28.
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